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SECURITIES REGULATION: SECTION 16(b) "PURCHASE" AND
"SALE" -AN OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE APPROACH?
Kern County Land Co. v. OccidentalPetroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1978)
Respondent acquired more than ten per cent of the outstanding stock of
petitioner Kern County Land Company's predecessor (Old Kern) during a
tender offer campaign. The attempted takeover was blocked, however, by a
defensive merger negotiated between Old Kern and Tenneco, Inc. Respondent,
faced with the possibility of holding a substantial but minority position in
Tenneco, granted a Tenneco subsidiary an option' to purchase the Tenneco
shares that respondent would receive pursuant to the merger. Upon completion of the merger and exercise of the option, petitioner brought suit for $19.5
million in profits realized by respondent,2 alleging that the exchange of stock
pursuant to the merger was a "sale," or alternatively that the option agreement should be considered a "sale," violative of section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.3 Summary judgment for petitioner in the district court4
was reversed by the Second Circuit. 5 The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed and HELD, neither the exchange of stock nor the option was the
type of transaction susceptible to speculative abuse and thus not a "sale"
within the meaning of the Act. 6
Section 16(b) was enacted to inhibit insiders,7 privy to information not
available to the public, from speculating in securities about which they have
inside information." Because of the difficulty of proving that certain insiders
actually misused information to gain a trading advantage, Congress enacted

1. The option agreement, which was exercisable no earlier than six months and one day
after expiration of respondent's tender offer, provided for a 10% downpayment to be applied against the purchase price. The downpayment was to be refunded if the merger were
not consummated and forfeited if the merger were finalized but the option not exercised.
411 U.S. 582, 588 (1973).
2. Respondent realized a profit in excess of $19.5 million from dividends and capital appreciation. Id. at 540.
3. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1970), provides in part: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [an insider] by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale ... of any equity security of such issuer ... within any period of less than six months
..shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such [insider]." See note 7 infra.
4. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
6. 411 U.S. 582, 600, 602 (1973) (Douglas, Brennan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
7. Corporate insiders include all directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than
10% of any class of any equity security of a corporation that is registered pursuant to §12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §78(a), (b) (1970).
8. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). An early writer suggested that
"behind this purpose lies the larger and predominant design to protect the securities market
from untoward influences." Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers, and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 133, 144 (1939).
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section 16(b) as a "crude rule of thumb" 9 raising a presumption of misuse of
information and intention to realize a "short swing" profit? 0
Two schools of thought have developed regarding the interpretative approach to be taken in defining section 16(b) transactions.1 The pragmatic
approach defines a purchase or sale as any transaction that can possibly lend
itself to short-term insider speculation. 1 2 If no such possibility exists, inquiry
stops at the threshold and liability may be avoided. If speculative abuse is
possible, however, any "unorthodox" transaction" is interpreted as a purchase
or sale, and liability ensues without regard to actual intent. Employing this
subjective approach, the Sixth Circuit in Ferraiolo v. Newman 4 held that an
inactive director's conversion of preferred convertible stock, having a fixed
conversion ratio, protected against dilution to common stock, did not constitute
a purchase under the 1934 Act. Since the value of the common stock would be
tied to the value of the preferred, the possibility of speculative abuse was
absent.' 5
In contrast, the second approach to section 16(b) does not consider the possibility of speculative abuse essential,16 and thus treats a transaction similar to
that in Ferraiolo as a purchaseJ" The primary goal of this objective line of
reasoning is to "squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus
to establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish
interest of [an insider] and the faithful performance of his duty."' 8 Nevertheless, the expressed purpose of the Act is to prevent "the unfair use of information.' ' 9 Why the Act should be applied when this purpose is not jeopardized
is difficult to envision.
The conflict between the two approaches is vividly illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinions in the instant case. The majority, adopting the
subjective approach, found that the exchange of stock pursuant to the merger

9. HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557
(1934).
10. Profits are "short swing" if they are derived from any series of transactions within a
six-month period.
11. "When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires - The terms
'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. The
terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C.
§78c(a)(13), (14) (1970).
12. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959).
13. See 2 L. Loss, SEcURMES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961); see, e.g., note 30 infra.
14. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
15. Id. at 345.
16. Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965) (conversion of debentures
to common stock held a sale of the debentures because no inquiry into misuse of information
essential).
17. E.g., Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947) (conversion of preferred convertible stock into common stock after recall held a
purchase of the common even though conversion virtually necessitated by recall).
18. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943) (emphasis added).
19. 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1970).
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was not a sale because of its involuntary nature and the lack of a possibility
of abuse of inside information. 20 Criticizing the majority's adoption of an approach seemingly contrary to the legislative purpose of including all transactions 2 1 the dissent predicted the effect of the decision would be to involve the
courts in an ad hoc analysis of each challenged transaction, thus increasing
2
litigation rather than deterring speculation.2
Close examination of the effect of the majority's ruling on the merger issue,
however, supports its conclusion, if not the subjective approach it employed.
A target corporation's management personnel is often under tremendous pressure to negotiate a merger before an attempted takeover, since its independent
control of the company or even the positions of some of its managers may be
in jeopardy. 23 As a result, the merger arranged may not be the most advantageous possible. 24 If section 16(b) liability were not a threat, the insider
would be free to contest or support the merger on the merits of the offer.
Conversely, even though the merger may be very beneficial to other stockholders, if section 16(b) would deprive the insider of all profits, he would be
forced to oppose or delay the merger beyond the six-month statutory period. 25
Although the dissent's objective test appears to be an effective check on
insider speculation, 2G its application to situations similar to the merger in the
instant case would yield even greater potential for speculative abuse. Under
this approach, the target corporation would be more attractive to the merger
partner because, upon successful completion of the merger, a huge gain derived from the insider's paper profits would accrue to the merged corporations
without any corresponding risk.27 Thus, the value of the target corporation's
stock, which frequently shows substantial gain during such a period,28 is en20. 411 U.S. at 599. The merger was an effort to frustrate respondents attempted takeover and, although respondent ultimately benefited, it did not negotiate the merger or vote
its Old Kern stock at the shareholders' meeting. Id.
21. Id. at 606-07.
22. Id. at 612 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Any uncertainty as to whether the courts would
apply the Act to a particular transaction would necessarily decrease its deterrent effect.
28. See Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting
Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104, 1105, 1126 (1969).
24. Id. at 1126.
25. See 84 HARv. L. REv. 1012, 1019 (1971). In the instant situation several suits were
instigated unsuccessfully to delay consummation of the merger. This litigation is described in
600 California Corp. v. Harjean Co., 284 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
26. The objective test has been characterized as a "bright line rule," presumably because
violation of the Act is clearly delineated where no inquiry into possible speculative abuse is
necessary. See 411 U.S. at 610.
27. See 84 HAv. L. REv. 1012, 1021 (1971). The amount of these paper profits would be
determined by the difference between the tender offer price paid by the insider and the fair

market value of the securities received by the insider pursuant to the merger. Since the insider would not yet have realized any cash profits, the merged corporations may gain the

additional advantage of forcing the insider to sell the newly acquired securities to satisfy his
§16(b) liability. Id. at 1022. Since in the instant situation the securities were purchased by
the merged corporations, the gain from this reduction in purchase price will not be realized
until the securities are resold.
28. E.g., Old Kern's stock increased from $53 5/8 to $95 per share during the option
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hanced even more by the possibility of a windfall at the insider's expense. The
insider would be faced with the choice of selling his stock at a profit and de29
livering the proceeds to the target or of taking evasive action.
The subjective approach employed by the majority is not without problems. The difficulty of applying the test to diverse corporate situations30 encourages insiders to take the chance that their actions will not be detected31
or, if detected, that a court will not find the subjective test met. Thus, the
deterrent effect of section 16(b) is considerably weakened32 and the prophy3
lactic effect partially destroyed. 3
Despite the majority's conclusion as to the exchange of stock, its refusal
to characterize as a sale the "call" 34 option granted to Tenneco by respondent
is questionable.35 The Court found the option was not a sale because no
possible opportunity to trade on inside information was present, 36 and ex'
ercise of the option was not "almost inevitable." 7
The Court's conclusion that there was no opportunity to trade on inside
information is not factually well founded. The district court found that respondent had access to the books and records of Old Kern prior to the signing

negotiations. 411 U.S. at 585 n.5, 588 n.14.
29. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). The insider reduced his
holdings to 9.96% in the first sale and escaped liability on the sale of the remaining stock
one month later. See also Comment, Short-Swing Speculation by Corporate Insiders: Widening the Loopholes in Section 16(b), 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 412 (1973). Another attractive technique would be to sell small blocks of the stock at no profit to the other members of the
corporate family or to favored customers.
30. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971) (option contract held to be a sale because a 14.3% payment for option to be
applied to the exercise price coupled with a change of directors and grant of proxy was in
substance, although not form, a sale); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) (date of sale held to be date of actual transfer rather than
date of contract for sale three and one-half years earlier); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954) (transfer of stock from parent to subsidiary held
a sale); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (payment
in stock of acquiring company to controlling stockholder of acquired company held a purchase).
31. The possibility of avoiding detection exists under either approach.
32. See, e.g., Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority, adopting the subjective test, held a conversion of preferred convertible
to common was not a purchase because the two stocks were economically equivalent and
thus devoid of any potential for speculation.
33. 411 U.S. at 612 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34. See generally Note, Put and Call Options Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 69 YALE L.J. 868 (1960).
35. "[T]he mere execution of an option to sell is not generally regarded as a 'sale."' 411
U.S. at 60. See, e.g., Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962) (a call for 1000 shares
and a put for 500 shares executed by insider held not to be a purchase or sale because insider could not control whether they were exercised). However, if the option is in fact a
sale it should be so construed. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir.
1970), explained in note 30 supra.
36. 411 U.S. at 601.
37. Id. at 603.
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of the option3s and could have used the information to determine whether
to sell its stock. 39 The majority in the instant case relied heavily on the fact
that respondent did not want to be locked into a minority position in a rival
corporation. 4° The possibility of using the inside information to which respondent had access, however, was not diminished by the existence of outside
motivations for selling.41 The majority also cited respondent's lack of inside
information regarding Tenneco,4 2 yet disregarded the fact that the value of
the new issue of Tenneco could be partially determined or at least projected
by inside knowledge of the financial position of Old Kern and the terms of
the merger agreement. Since the Court's subjective approach does not require
actual speculative abuse of inside information but only the possibility of such
abuse, 4 3 this criterion appears to be satisfied in spite of the majority's conclusion.

The majority also disagreed with the district court's findings in examining
the second factor- whether exercise of the option was inevitable.4 4 The majority relied on questionable expert testimony that "the option was worth the
premium paid" 45 and that Tenneco's intention in accepting the option was to
"rid itself of a potentially troublesome stockholder." 46 Ironically, honorable as
this additional motive may have been, it is but further evidence that Tenneco
was virtually forced to complete the purchase.47 Although respondent retained
ownership and voting rights of the stock during the option period, suit for
inspection of the books and records of Old Kern and demands for positions
on the board of directors were abandoned. 48
The conflicting conclusions of the majority and dissent provide an interesting contrast. The dissent's result on the merger issue49 reached by tenacious

38. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570, 575 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
39. Id. at 575.
40. 411 U.S. at 601.
41. See, e.g., Newmark v. R.K.O. General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970) (purchase of stock of corporation to be acquired by acquiring corporation's
majority stockholder and exchange in merger held to be a purchase and sale even though
motivated by a desire to maintain a majority position in the acquiring corporation). See also
Gadsby 9- Treadway, Recent Developments Under Section 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 17 N.Y.L.F. 687 (1971).
42. 411 U.S. at 603.
43. Id. at 600.
44. Id. at 603.
45. Id. at 604. The expert testimony relied upon by the majority was a deposition of an
Occidental vice president regarding advice received from an investment firm. Both the information available to the firm and the assumptions made would be necessary to evaluate
the relevancy of the testimony properly. Id. at 616 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 603.
47. The only reasonable interpretation of the district court's decision was that "the
option was in fact and substance a sale." Id. at 614 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 616 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Relinquishment of these ownership-related demands indicates respondent believed exercise of the option to be almost inevitable.
49, The dissent invoked "a conclusive presumption that an insider who turns a shortswing profit in the stock of his corporation had access to inside information and capitalized
on that information by speculating in the stock." Id. at 611. Thus, the exchange of stock
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adherence to an entirely objective approach, is perhaps the best argument for
a subjective test. Removing profits from exchanges of stock forced by a merger
actually creates additional market speculation in a target corporation's stock 0
and provides the target with a new defensive weapon. 51 Similarly, the majority's questionable application of the subjective standard on the option question strengthens the dissent's argument for an objective approach. Under the
Court's decision the lure of large profits and the hope of escaping liability52
can combine to frustrate the purpose of section 16(b).
Clearly, the solution lies between the two theories advanced by the conflicting opinions. The objective test should be limited to those transactions
the insider has a substantial possibility of controlling. 53 If there is no substantial possibility to control the transaction, the subjective test is an adequate
method of deterring speculative abuse of inside information.
The terms of the option agreement in the instant case were negotiated and
controlled by the respondent and Tenneco. Thus, the parties controlled the
possibility or probability of the option being exercised. The objective test
should therefore be applied to the option contract to determine if the terms
compelled its exercise without any inquiry into the possibility of the misuse of
54
information.
On the other hand, the merger agreement could not realistically be controlled by respondent, and was negotiated to frustrate respondent's attempted
takeover. Since the control element was lacking, the merger should be measured by the subjective test. Under this analysis the merger would escape section 16(b) liability because it lacked the possibility of speculative abuse.55
This two-tiered approach to section 16(b) would have the desired deterrent
effect in those situations in which the insider can control the transaction. At
the same time it would prevent the Act from being employed as a tactical
weapon in corporate mergers and takeovers. 56 Questions of fact such as those
encountered under the subjective test remain, 57 but the deterrent effect of

pursuant to the merger would be a sale invoking §16(b) liability.
50. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
51. Id. The target will still lose its independent existence but can choose its merger
partner rather than submitting to takeover by the tender offeror.
52. See, e.g., Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971) (although the court ultimately found the director liable, a $600,000 profit coupled
with a possibility of escaping liability overcame the deterrent effect of the Act).
53. See 84 HARV. L. REv. 1012, 1018 (1971) (recommends excluding from objective test
those transactions over which insider can exercise "no control").
54. 411 U.S. at 617 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 600.
56. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
57. The subjective approach inherently must deal with the question of whether a possibility of misusing information exists. See, e.g., Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) (reclassification of all common stock held not to be a
purchase under the subjective approach because no possibility of speculative abuse existed);
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (acquisition of
stock in exchange for defendant's company held to be a purchase because manipulation
possible). Similarly, both approaches must inquire into the realities of option agreements.
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section 16(b) would be strengthened without adopting the rigid objective test.
Whatever the solution's form, some middle ground must be found to prevent
continued frustration of congressional purpose through litigation and insider
speculation.
JAMES L. MAIN

See, e.g., notes 30, 35 supra.
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